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Abstract 
We study whether individual decisions to invest in the host country, such as taking up 
training, improving language skills, or naturalisation explain differences in labour market 
integration between migrants depending on their initial motivation. We use cross-national 
European data from the 2008 ad-hoc module of the labour force survey and use an estimated 
dependent variable to analyse migrant gaps in labour market participation, employment, 
occupational status and employment precariousness. Non-economic migrants, and especially 
refugees, are less well integrated than economic migrants, but these differences diminish over 
time due to different rates of and returns to investments in host-country human capital.   
 
  





Given increasing public concern about migration and the current refugee crisis across 
Europe, it is crucial to learn which factors contribute to successful incorporation and whether 
these factors are the same for migrants regardless of their reason for moving. Traditionally, 
migrant incorporation is studied as a homogenous process where labour market outcomes 
improve over time through the acquisition of knowledge about the host country, e.g. better 
language skills. In this paper we study whether this same pattern holds for economic migrants 
and non-economic migrants such as those seeking refuge and family migrants.  
We use the detailed cross-national data from the 2008 ad-hoc module in the EU 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) to study differences in labour market integration patterns 
between several groups of migrants to the EU. We use an estimated dependent variable to 
measure labour market integration as the gap in terms of participation, employment and job 
quality compared to similar natives. This allows us to study how these gaps differ between 
groups of migrants depending on their initial reason for arriving, how they change with years 
of residence, and the extent to which investments in host-country human capital affect 
migrants differently in explaining their labour market integration. The next section briefly 
discusses the literature and our expectations regarding these questions. We then describe the 
data and the methods used to study this labour market integration.  
2. Conceptual framework 
The focus of this paper is on types of migrants according to their reason for migration. 
Studies have used different ways to measure migrant motivations depending on the 
availability of data. A first approach uses information on the country of origin and the period 
in which someone migrated to impute their likely motivation (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 
2010; Kausar and Drinkwater, 2010) or to measure the likelihood of someone being a refugee 
through measures of political oppression or stability (as in e.g. Fleischmann and Dronkers, 




2010; Spörlein and Van Tubergen, 2014; van Tubergen et al., 2004; ). A second approach 
uses legal categories of arrival into the country as a way to distinguish between migrants 
(Aydemir, 2009; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2014; Cortes, 2004; Husted et al., 2009). The 
benefit is that more is known about the legal context in which they enter the country of 
residence. The last approach, and the one we follow here, is using self-reported measures of 
reasons for migration. This is likely to be closer to the true reason for migration than entry 
visas, as a visa is a legal category which can have substantial implications for the individual 
and may not always reflect the truth completely (Campbell, 2014; Dumont et al., 2016; 
Hatton, 2012). 
There are substantial differences in outcomes and how they change over time between 
migrants with different main motivations. In general, migrants arriving for family reasons or 
as refugees are found to do substantially worse than economic migrants on the labour market 
(Aydemir, 2009; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2014). Cangiano (2015) uses the same data set 
we do to analyse labour market integration over different European countries and finds that 
non-economic migrants are less likely to find employment and when working work on lower 
quality jobs than other, similarly qualified, migrants. While their paper discusses the role of 
migration policies, we focus on the individual factors explaining this.   
Some studies have addressed differences in how labour market outcomes change with 
years of residence. These studies mainly focused on refugees and found that, despite their 
initial disadvantage on the labour market, refugees tend to catch up to other categories of 
migrants over time (Aydemir, 2009; Campbell, 2014; Cangiano, 2015; Cortes, 2004). A 
possible reason is that refugees have a longer time horizon than other migrants as they are 
often not able to return to their country of origin. They are therefore more likely to invest in 
host-country human capital such as taking up language training or nationality (Cortes, 2004; 
Dustmann, 2008).  




The literature has put forward several possible reasons for why migration motivation 
affects labour market integration. Non-economic migrants are thought to be less positively 
selected in terms of human capital and motivation which results in them doing less well on 
the labour market compared to economic migrants (e.g. van Tubergen et al., 2004). We then 
expect that non-economic migrants experience larger penalties on the labour market 
compared to economic migrants (H1a), but that this gap becomes smaller once differences in 
individual characteristics and origin are accounted for (H1b). As part of this selection is 
unobservable some difference would remain.  
The resources someone has access to in the country of destination are also likely to 
differ between types of migrants. Migrants arriving for family reunification for instance 
generally already have some networks in the country of destination through their partner 
which could help them find work (Aydemir, 2009). These initial contacts are likely to be 
important in finding work initially and can affect further integration trajectories. Migrants 
arriving as students can build up networks and connections during their study which would 
also put them at more of an advantage compared to those who enter the labour market 
directly after migration. They are highly qualified and generally obtained these qualifications 
in the country of residence which would also result in better labour market outcomes 
Refugees often experienced substantial trauma which can negatively affect their labour 
market outcomes (Connor, 2010a). Among non-economic migrants we therefore expect 
students and family migrants to generally do better than refugees (H2a); while among 
economic migrants those who arrive to fill a certain vacancy and have a guaranteed job upon 
entry to do better than economic migrants arriving looking for work (H2b).  
Whether the main motivation is an economic one is also likely to affect the 
importance of finding any work to make the migration a success and therefore affect the 
reservation wage. Luthra, Platt and Salamonska (2016) showed that recently arrived Eastern 




European migrants differed in how unemployment affected life satisfaction with the effects 
being far stronger for economic migrants whose success is based on finding work. We expect 
economic migrants to be more integrated than non-economic migrants with regards to 
employment, but we would see less clear differences in terms of job quality (H3).  
Learning the language, taking up host-country nationality or obtaining qualifications 
or training are forms of human capital that can be specific to the country of residence. 
Investing in these would decrease the difference in labour market outcomes between migrants 
and natives. We call these decisions choices or investments because they require a deliberate 
decision; cost time, effort and sometimes money; and bring about an expected return on the 
labour market (Chiswick, 2009; Cortes, 2004; De Vroome and van Tubergen, 2010). This is 
not to say that these decisions are necessarily a ‘free’ choice. There can be substantial 
constraints – low skilled migrants may not have the financial resources or accrue them over a 
longer period of time to be able to acquire receiving society specific investments such as 
language skills, qualifications, job training or citizenship (Barry, 2001).  
Part of the reason why labour market integration improves over time is thought to be 
precisely because these types of host-country human capital are accumulated with time (Alba 
and Nee, 1997). In this paper we study whether this process occurs similarly for all migrants 
and whether these types of host-country human capital investment have the same effect on 
different aspects of labour market integration. As mentioned earlier, there are differences 
between migrants depending on their reason for migration in the take-up of host-country 
nationality or the improvement of language skills (Cortes, 2004; Dumont et al., 2016). 
Groups that invest more heavily, because they have a longer time horizon for instance, would 
then experience the fastest trajectory towards equity with natives. Accepted refugees also 
tend to benefit from more public assistance and can be naturalised upon regularisation 
(Bevelander and Pendakur, 2014). This leads to the expectation that especially refugees, but 




also migrants arriving for family reasons who can be expected to have a longer time horizon 
on average than economic migrants, experience a faster growth in labour market integration 
with years of residence (H4a) than other migrants. These differences in growth over time 
would then be reduced by including host-country human capital characteristics (H4b).  
The role of host-country human capital in explaining differences between types of 
migrants has mainly been studied in the US, focusing on refugees. Connor (2010a) finds that 
refugees are 60% less likely than economic migrants to work on a skilled job and earn 19% 
less than economic migrants. Differences in language ability, being schooled in the US and to 
a lesser extent health and neighbourhood location differences accounted for up to 50% of this 
disadvantage. Cortes (2004) shows that the annual earnings of refugees rise faster than those 
of economic immigrants which is partly due to their higher improvement in language skills. 
Besides different rates of investment, there may also be differences in the returns to 
these investments between migrants. Host-country human capital may be more beneficial for 
otherwise more disadvantaged groups as it provides a strong signal that can overrides the 
mainly negative view. Naturalisation is for instance found to affect disadvantaged migrants 
more positively than the more advantaged (Corluy et al., 2011). Non-economic migrants are 
also likely to be less well matched to the host-country labour market initially and would 
therefore benefit more from further investment than economic migrants. We then expect that 
non-economic migrants and especially refugees benefit more from having higher host-
country human capital than economic migrants (H5).  
Higher host-country human capital is expected to be positively associated with job 
quality, but would not necessarily improve employment probability (H6a). Many migrants 
generally find work in lower-skilled sectors where high human capital is not required (e.g. 
Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). Higher host-country human capital may even have a negative 
effect as it drives reservation wages up and lowers the probability of taking low-quality work. 




If this mechanism holds we would expect a lower employment probability, but especially for 
economic migrants rather than non-economic migrants as the former are expected to have 
lower reservation wages initially (H6b).   
3. Data and variables 
We test these hypotheses in a comparative way using the 2008 ad-hoc module of the 
European LFS. This is a large-scale harmonized survey in European countries and produces 
reliable estimates in terms of stocks of non-nationals despite not primarily targeting migrants 
(Martí and Ródenas, 2007). The 2008 ad-hoc module provides information on the 
experiences of migrants and contains harmonized questions on the main reason for migration, 
perceptions of language skills, use of services and whether migrants naturalised.  
The sample for the main analyses is restricted to first generation migrants who were 
not nationals at birth, aged 25 to 65. After listwise deletion of observations with missing 
values our sample includes 20,198 migrants in 14 countries.1 Descriptive statistics for all 
variables and the estimated outcome variables are shown in tables A1 (for women) and A2 
(for men) in the supplementary material.  
We study four labour market outcomes. The first two are participation on the labour 
market (binary) and employment (binary). While employment of migrants likely matters most 
to public opinion the quality of work is also crucial for full integration. We study the 
occupational status of jobs through the ISEI scale, a socio-economic indicator ranging from 
16 (lowest) to 90 (highest), imputed through 3-digit occupational codes (Ganzeboom and 
Treiman, 1996). We also include a binary variable for working on an involuntary non-
standard contract, showing precarious work (Buchholz et al., 2009). This “bad job” dummy 
                                                 
1
 Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden and the UK 




indicates that someone works part-time but wants to work more hours or works on a 
temporary contract because a permanent position was not available. 
We include six categories for migration motivation, measuring the primary reason. 
First, there are two types of economic migrants: those who arrive as intra corporate transfers 
or who had a job ready prior to migration; and those who arrive to look for work. Non-
economic migrants are separated in three groups: migrants who arrived as students and 
remained; those seeking international protection; and migrants arriving for family formation 
or reunification. Finally we include a rest category of migrants with other motives.  
To measure labour market integration over time we include years of residence. This is 
reported as exact years until 10 and afterwards as 5 year intervals for which the midpoint is 
imputed so the variable can be treated as continuous.  
One of the main reasons why migrants are expected to get lower returns to their 
qualifications is that there is more uncertainty about their skills (e.g. Chiswick and Miller, 
2008; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). We include two dummy variables to proxy an investment 
towards reducing this uncertainty (Basilio et al., 2014; Battu and Sloane, 2004; De Vroome 
and van Tubergen, 2010). First, whether someone followed any training or other courses in 
the last 4 weeks; and second whether someone either obtained their highest qualifications in 
the country of residence or has taken steps towards equivalising their qualifications obtained 
abroad. 
Speaking the language well is crucial for further integration and often a requirement 
for finding good employment and making use of public services, bringing substantial returns 
on the labour market (Campbell, 2014; Cebulla et al., 2010; Cheung, 2013; Cortes, 2004; 
Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003). The ad-hoc module includes a question on whether respondents 
feel they need to improve their language skills to get an appropriate job which is reversed to 




indicate good language skills. The question is not ideal but it does indicate an assessment of 
the own language skills.  
As a final indicator of investments in the country of residence we include a dummy 
for taking up the nationality after the age of 16. This provides a strong signal on the labour 
market and is associated with better outcomes (Corluy et al., 2011). Migrants who had 
nationality at birth are not included in the analyses. Previous studies found that less 
advantaged migrants are more likely to naturalise (Vink et al., 2013) and that refugees tend to 
have higher returns to naturalization in terms of employment (Dumont et al., 2016). As a 
robustness test we restrict the sample to migrants who were in the country longer than 10 
years as it is normally possible to naturalise in all countries considered here (Dumont et al., 
2016). We find no substantial differences.  
Table 1 below shows the distribution of these variables over motivation groups. The 
majority of male migrants are economic while among women almost half arrive for family 
reasons. There are substantial differences between groups in their host-country human 
capital. As expected, student migrants have very high levels of human capital, especially 
following training and having equivalent qualifications. Overall, economic migrants without 
a job ready stand out as having relatively low scores on all types of investment while 
migrants who arrived with a job have generally higher human capital. Migrants seeking 
protection and family migrants have relatively poor language skills, but score high on other 
types of human capital investments with particularly refugees very likely to take up host-
country nationality.  
[Table 1 around here] 
In this paper we measure labour market integration as the difference in labour market 
outcomes of migrants and that of similar natives. This is done using coarsened exact 
matching (Iacus et al., 2012) as explained further in the methods section. The variables on 




which migrants are matched to natives are the region at NUTS level2, age3, gender, whether 
they are married, and qualifications4. Besides including these control variables in the models 
to account for remaining differences (Iacus et al., 2012) we also control for certain 
characteristics of the origin countries.  
One of the problems with the European labour force survey is that country of birth is only 
provided in highly aggregated groups5. As these groups are associated with migrant 
motivation and not directly meaningful we do not include them, but use relevant 
characteristics from the sending region, calculated as the average of the values for the 
relevantcountries, weighted by the share of migrants that each country makes up of the total 
amount of migrants from that region in a given country of destination. The shares are 
obtained by the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) from 2010.  
The share of Christians in the sending country, obtained through the world religion 
dataset for the year 2005 (Maoz and Henderson, 2013), is used to indicate religious closeness 
to the receiving country. We also include female labour force participation and the share of 
graduates (Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010; van Tubergen et al., 2004). Following van 
Tubergen et al. (2004) we include two ratio variables (in logarithmic form) to capture 
selection. The ratio of the Gini coefficient in the sending region to that of the receiving 
country is used to indicate selection based on whether migrants assume they will do relatively 
better (worse) in a more equal country, based on their perception of whether they would be at 
the higher or lower end of the distribution. The ratio of GDP per capita indicates whether 
migrants move from more to less developed areas or the reverse.  
                                                 
2
 1-digit NUTS level: 3 in Austria; 3 in Belgium; 16 in Germany; 7 in Spain; 8 in France; 4 in Greece; 2 in 
Ireland; 5 in Italy; 1 in Luxembourg, 1 in the Netherlands; 7 in Norway; 5 in Portugal; 3 in Sweden; 11 in UK 
3
 Age is measured in 5-year intervals from 25 to 64. 
4
 7 ISCED codes ranging from pre-primary/ no degree to upper tertiary. 
5
 Categories are: “own country”, “EU15”, “NMS10”, “NMS3”, “EFTA”, “Other Europe”, “North Africa” 
“Other Africa”, “Near Middle East”, “East Asia”, “South and South-East Asia”, “North America”, “Central 
America”, “South America”, Australia/Oceania”, “Latin America” with some countries have further 
aggregations of all new member states; EFTA and other Europe; North Africa and the Near Middle East; South 
and East Asia; North America and Australia. 




The share of graduates, female labour force participation, Gini coefficient and GDP 
per capita (in current US dollars) are all obtained from the World Bank6. As a final indicator 
we include a dummy for being born in a current EU member state.   
4. Methods 
Full labour market integration would mean migrants have the same opportunities as 
natives. The difference in observed outcomes between migrants and similar natives, or 
migrant gaps, would then be smaller for a more integrated migrant (Algan et al., 2010).  
We estimate this gap directly and then aim to explain the differences in labour market 
integration for groups of migrants by years of residence and investment in human capital. A 
similar 2-stage method was used by Connor (2010b) to study gaps in religiosity between 
Muslim migrants and natives. We use coarsened exact matching to calculate the difference 
between a migrant (treated) and similar natives (controls) within strata consisting of observed 
characteristics after coarsening continuous variables into categories (Iacus et al., 2012). By 
equalising the distribution of covariates between migrants and natives we do not have to rely 
on extrapolation through modelling assumptions and potential non-linearity is taken into 
account.  
We used 483,707 natives in the LFS to form counterfactuals, divided over 6,322 strata 
made up of combinations of region, age, gender, marital status and qualifications, in which 
both natives (at least 5) and migrants were present. Within each strata the average labour 
force participation, employment rate, occupational status and share of involuntary non-
standard contracts among natives was computed.  
In the second step, this difference between the observed outcome for a migrant and 
this average outcome among similar natives is the dependent variable in linear regression 
                                                 
6
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator, accessed 18/03/2016. Values from 2008 are used (and average of 2007-
2009 if 2008 was not available) 




models. We use robust standard errors, clustered at the regional level, to account for the 
higher measurement error introduced by using an estimated dependent variable (Lewis and 
Linzer, 2005). Analyses are carried out separately by gender as men and women differ in 
their labour market integration patterns and it is also difficult to separate family from refugee 
migrants among women (Dumont et al., 2016). All analyses are weighted using the weights 
provided by the EU LFS. 
We ask two main questions: first about the different patterns in labour market 
integration for migrants with different motivations; and second about the effects of host-
country human capital and the degree to which they explain these differences. The first 
question is answered through estimating equation 1.   
D(Yis – Ŷs) = α+ β1*REAS  +  β2*X + β3*D + β4*YEARS + β5*YEARS*YEARS + 
γ1*REAS*YEARS + γ2*REAS*YEARS*YEARS + ε                  (eq.1) 
The outcome variable is the difference between the observed outcome and the 
counterfactual among similar natives, which is estimated. The main variable of interest is the 
reason for migration (REAS). X is a vector of controls including marital status, education and 
age (squared) as well as controls for the sending region characteristics. D is a vector of 
dummies for country of destination. Length of residence is included (YEARS) and to allow 
for non-linear trajectories we also include its square. Years of migration (squared) is 
interacted with main motivation for migration through interaction terms γ1 and γ2. To 
facilitate the interpretation of results we study marginal effects and predicted probabilities.  
D(Yis – Ŷs) = α+ β’1*REAS  +  β’2*X + β’3*D + β’4*YEARS + β’5*YEARS*YEARS + 
γ’1*REAS*YEARS + γ’2*REAS*YEARS*YEARS + δ1*HC + δ1*REAS*HC + ε         (eq.2) 
Equation 2 includes the indicators of host-country human capital (HC), allowing for 
different effects depending on main migration motivation. This model allows us to test 
whether part of the differences between migrant groups or in their trajectories over time is 




mediated by host-country human capital. This can be done by comparing the coefficients, and 
estimated effects given the different interactions, in equation 1 to those in equation 2. A 
reduction in these effects would indicate that part of the differences is due to a different 
investments (Mackinnon and Dwyer, 1993). The coefficients δ1 also test whether the returns 
to host-country human capital investments differ by motivation.  
5. Results 
Figure 1 below shows the estimated gap in labour market outcomes between migrants 
and natives. The bars indicate the average difference, only accounting for country fixed 
effects; while the symbols show the difference between migrants and similar natives after 
matching with the 95% confidence intervals. Table A3 in the supplementary material shows 
the numbers as well as the averages for economic and non-economic migrants.  
We find that economic migrants are more integrated than non-economic migrants in 
terms of employment as employment gaps are 3 and 6 percentage points smaller for men and 
women respectively. There is no clear difference in terms of job quality however, supporting 
hypothesis 3. We also find that the groups that are likely to have access to more resources 
upon migration do better than those that did not, supporting hypothesis 2. Economic migrants 
with a contract outperform economic migrants who arrive without work on all outcomes 
except for employment among women. Refugees are less integrated than student or family 
migrants on all outcomes.  
[Figure 1 around here] 
We hypothesized that accounting for composition would diminish some of the 
differences between groups of migrants as it accounts for partly for selection. The difference 
between the highest and lowest gap decreases for activity among women by 4 p.p.; for 
employment by 4 p.p. for men and 2 p.p. for women; and in occupational status by 11-15 
ISEI points. Matching does not reduce the difference in working on a bad job however. We 




therefore find some support for hypothesis 1b as compositional factors do account for part of 
the difference in integration in terms of activity, employment and occupational status by 
motivation. 
These average differences hide changes with years of residence. We briefly discuss 
the estimated patterns here and they are shown in figures A1 and A2 in the supplementary 
material. Migrants remain more likely to be active on the labour market than natives 
regardless of years of residence. In the other outcomes there is convergence to natives over 
time although gaps remain, especially with regards to occupational status and non-standard 
work for men. Refugees generally experience the largest initial gaps and catch up slowly over 
time, consistent with the literature (e.g. Cangiano, 2015; Cortes, 2004). Employment gaps are 
largest initially for non-economic migrants, but in terms of occupational status the most 
disadvantaged group are economic migrants without a contract who experience large gaps 
and do not catch up to other groups.  The interactions between reason for migration and years 
of residence (squared) are only jointly statistically significant (at p<0.05) for activity for 
female immigrants and employment and working on an involuntary non-standard contract for 
men. 
Table 2 shows the effects of an extra year of residence, estimated at 5 years of 
residence, before and after including host-country human capital in the regression models as 
described by equations 1 and 2 resp. in the methods section. It also shows the reduction in the 
effect (in percentage) after including host-country human capital. These effects are shown 
graphically in figure A3 at 5 years of residence and figure A4 at 15 years of residence in the 
supplementary material. We find similar patterns when studying the effect of an extra year of 
residence at 15 years of residence although the effects are generally smaller. Full coefficients 
are shown in table A4 in the supplementary material.  
[Table 2 around here] 




As expected, non-economic migrants and in particular refugees make the most 
progress over time while economic migrants see less change over time. As student migrants 
also make large gains hypothesis 4a is only partially supported however. We also find that 
substantial parts of this increase in labour market integration are diminished when host-
country human capital is taken into account, especially for refugees and more strongly for 
women than for men. Host-country human capital mainly explains changes in job quality 
over time. Substantial parts of the estimated increase in occupational status over years of 
residence disappear when controlling for host-country human capital and the effect is reduced 
by up to 87% in the case of female refugees.   
Including host-country human capital reduces the effect of years of residence on 
employment more for non-economic migrants than economic migrants. This could indicate 
that the benefit in employability is outweighed by rising reservation wages for economic 
migrants. Including host-country human capital does not really reduce the overall differences 
in effects of years of residence by main motivation however, with the exception of activity. 
We therefore partly accept hypothesis 4b, as some of the effect of years of residence is indeed 
accounted for by host-country human capital, especially for non-economic migrants in 
employment and in job quality, but the overall variability does not diminish. 
Finally we study how the effects of host-country human capital affect labour market 
integration. We briefly discuss the effects of individual investments by motivation, shown in 
figures 2 and 3.   
[Figure 2 around here] 
[Figure 3 around here] 
The effects of these types of host-country human capital vary substantially between 
groups. We find that all types of investment tend to be positively associated with 
occupational status with some exceptions by groups. Having recently attended a course is not 




associated with higher status jobs for male refugee and family migrants and having better 
language skills also does not affect the status of jobs for male student or family migrants. 
Attending training and naturalization is negatively associated with employment for male 
refugees and female economic migrants with a contract upon arrival. Having equivalent 
qualifications is strongly positively associated with employment for male refugee and female 
family migrants.  
To interpret the effects of host-country human capital more fully, figure 4 shows the 
estimated penalty for migrants with low host-country human capital (reporting needing better 
language skills; not naturalized and no equivalent qualifications) and those with high host-
country human capital (no language problems, equivalised qualifications and naturalized). 
We do not include having attended training recently as fewer migrants have done this. In our 
sample, 7.4% (2,228) have low host-country human capital while 12.6% (3,777) have high 
host-country human capital. The values and the difference between them are shown in table 
A5 in the supplementary material. 
[Figure 4 around here] 
A first observation is that migrant penalties are generally substantially smaller for 
migrants with high than for those with low host-country human capital although there are 
variations between groups. The largest gains in activity and employment are made by refugee 
and family migrants. Regarding job quality the difference between high and low host-country 
human capital is very large for student and refugee migrants, but it also matters a lot for 
economic migrants who arrive seeking work. A second observation is that, especially with 
regards to being active on the labour market and employment, but to a lesser extent also for 
job quality indicators, the difference in penalty by main motivation is smaller for migrants 
with high than for those with low host-country human capital.  




Having equivalent qualifications, speaking the language well and being naturalized, 
seem to take away some of the uncertainty and disadvantage that may otherwise differentiate 
more between different types of migrants. Among migrants who lack these resources 
penalties can be quite severe however, with family and refugee migrants being 7 to 20 p.p. 
less likely to be employed than similar natives; occupational status gaps ranging from 7 to 16 
ISEI-points and especially non-economic migrants being much more likely to work on 
involuntary non-standard job contracts than similar natives. 
High human capital in the country of residence is associated with doing better in 
terms of labour market outcomes, although gaps remain. These investments are particularly 
important for the more disadvantaged groups such as refugees and family migrants where 
they are important in gaining access to the labour market in the first place as well as in job 
quality, support hypothesis 5. In support of hypothesis 6a we find that differences between 
those with high and low host-country human capital are relatively larger for job quality than 
for the probability of employment or being economically active. The benefits of host-country 
human capital on employment are mainly present for non-economic migrants while for 
economic migrants the effect is smaller or even negative. This supports hypothesis 6b, 
indicating that higher capital might increase the reservation wage, leading to higher 
unemployment but also higher quality work.  
6. Limitations and Robustness tests 
In this section we briefly discuss the limitations of the data and these analyses and 
show results from two sensitivity analyses. As the LFS is a cross-sectional dataset we cannot 
study the actual accumulation of host-country human capital and changing labour market 
integration over time, but only compare migrants who arrived in different years. Different 
attrition probabilities could be the reason for converging between migrant groups over time, 
rather than a catching up of non-economic migrants. We might also capture changes between 




cohorts of migrants rather than over time. To assess the sensitivity of our results to this time 
dimension, we estimate the full model (equation 2) again on a subsample of migrants who 
have remained in the country for 10 years or longer. We hypothesize that the different return 
probabilities are less of an issue in this sample of people who stayed relatively long already. 
While the regulations regarding naturalisation differ over European countries, it is generally 
an available option for those who remained in the country of destination for longer than 10 
years (Dumont et al., 2016). This sample therefore also allows us to estimate the effect of 
naturalization more robustly.  
As a second test we restrict the analyses to only non-EU migrants. This is important 
as EU migrants have more extensive legal rights of residence and work than non-EU citizens 
and often entered via different ways.  
The estimated effects of an extra year of residence and of the indicators of host-
country human capital (from equation 2) on employment and occupational status are shown 
in table A6 and table A7 in the supplementary material. Full results are available on request 
with the author. 
While there are some variations between models there are generally no substantial 
differences in the trajectory over time or the effects of host-country human capital between 
the different models, although as the sample is smaller effects are not always statistically 
significant. There is some difference in the effect of naturalisation for male refugees however 
where their benefit in occupational status disappears in the subsample of migrants 10 years 
after residence. This means that they benefit especially from naturalisation relatively shortly 
after arrival which may be because naturalisation then may indicate more governmental 
support that assists in finding better jobs. This shows our results are relatively robust to 
different specifications are not only driven by relatively recent migrants or by EU migrants.  




A final important point is that integration patterns for different motivation groups 
likely depend strongly on the national context. In a recent joint report by the OECD and the 
European Commission it was shown that refugees tend to do relatively better in countries 
where they are fewer, such as in Spain (Dumont et al., 2016). Cangiano (2015) discusses the 
differences between countries and their policies in more detail, showing that there are 
substantial differences between countries in the composition of migrants, the support they 
receive, and the relative gaps. They find little difference between economic and non-
economic migrants in Spain and Italy, while in countries that prioritise non-economic 
migrants such as Germany, France and Sweden these are much more at risk of 
overqualification. In this paper we focused instead on the mechanisms leading to differences 
between motivation groups and only accounted for the country of residence as also studying 
policy differences is beyond the scope for this work.   
7. Conclusion 
We set out to study whether the motivation with which a migrant originally arrived in 
a European country affects their labour market integration and whether these differences are 
due to investments in the host-country human capital. This paper shows the importance of 
considering the heterogeneity by motivation among migrants. We find that migrants who 
arrived looking for work experience smaller employment gaps than those that arrived for 
family reasons, to study, or seeking refuge. There are less clear differences between these two 
groups in terms of job quality however as we find that economic migrants who arrived 
without a contract at the time of entry tend to work on substantially lower-quality jobs than 
natives and experience less upward integration over time than non-economic migrants. We 
find some support for the idea that those migrants who have more resources upon entry also 
do better on the labour market compared to natives, even after accounting for individual 
characteristics.  




We found that family and refugee migrants are generally quite disadvantaged in the 
earlier years after migration, but the gaps with other migrants diminish over time. This is 
especially the case for their probability of being employed. Part of this catching-up is due to 
differences in the probability of being naturalised, taking up extra education or equivalising 
qualifications, and language skills. We also find that these types of investment in the host-
country human capital have larger effects for the generally more disadvantaged migrants who 
arrive for family reasons or fleeing violence, although they affect the quality of work for all 
migrants.  
A reason for this may be that these investments provide a strong signal, which is 
especially beneficial to those with lower skills and from a more disadvantaged group who 
may face more statistical discrimination and whose skills are less matched with the 
requirements of the country of origin. We find that the differences between migrant groups 
are particularly large among migrants with low language skills, qualifications that are not 
recognised in the country and without host-country nationality. Among those with higher 
host-country human capital the differences between motivation groups are substantially 
smaller however.  
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14.3 7.1% 26.4% 84. 9% 12.6% 17.0% 
Employment no 
job 
13.3 2.8% 15.7% 78.1% 14.0% 34.7% 
Study 16.4 16.3% 81.7% 90.8% 33.7% 6.2% 
Refugee 15.2 7.0% 46.6% 75.6% 60.3% 10.3% 
Family 15.9 7.8% 41.1% 84.3% 34.6% 21.8% 
Other 16.0 7.3% 37.5% 86.3% 30.0% 10.1% 
Women 
(N=9,807) 
      
Employment 
job 
14.0 11.5% 37.2% 83.1% 14.8% 9.4% 
Employment no 
job 
12.2 4.7% 21.1% 78.9% 15.1% 20.4% 
Study 15.0 19.6% 76.8% 88.5% 27.7% 5.7% 
Refugee 15.4 9.6% 45.9% 71.3% 67.0% 6.4% 
Family 16.0 9.7% 40.7% 80.4% 37.2% 48.1% 
Other 15.5 9.6% 43.2% 84.1% 32.4% 10.0% 
Source: LFS ad-hoc module 2008 for migrants aged 25-65 and having been in the country of 
residence longer than 5 years.  
  




Table 2: Effect of extra years of residence at 5 years before including human capital investment and % explained by including it.  
 Active Employed Occupational status (ISEI) Bad job 
Men prior Post % 
explained 
prior Post % 
explained 
prior Post % 
explained 




-0.14 -0.18 NR 0.28 0.29 NR 0.11 0.13 NR -0.39 -0.47 NR 
Employment 
no job 
-0.04 -0.05 NR -0.13 -0.14 NR 0.07 0.03 59.0 -0.69 -0.69 0.2 
Study 0.03 -0.04 226.9 0.63 0.72 NR 0.44 0.20 54.3 0.36 0.72 NR 
Refugee 0.63 0.26 59.4 0.84 0.37 56.3 0.43 0.30 30.1 -1.17 -1.10 6.3 
Family -0.07 -0.17 NR 0.59 0.51 13.2 0.49 0.39 19.7 -0.86 -0.79 7.9 
Other -0.20 -0.23 NR 0.17 0.19 NR 0.26 0.09 63.8 -0.10 0.07 171.2 
Range  0.83 0.48  0.97 0.86  1.54 1.82  0.42 0.36  
Women             
Employment 
job 
-1.00 -0.99 0.8 -0.15 -0.17 NR 0.33 0.29 11.6 -0.28 -0.21 24.4 
Employment 
no job 
0.31 0.36 NR 0.09 0.07 22.1 0.53 0.35 33.3 -0.59 -0.52 10.7 
Study -0.05 -0.30 NR 0.35 0.26 23.9 1.10 0.83 24.1 -1.46 -1.28 12.2 
Refugee 1.52 0.67 55.7 1.48 1.23 17.0 0.41 0.05 87.1 -1.46 -0.93 35.9 
Family 0.32 0.24 24.7 0.42 0.35 17.3 0.44 0.29 33.0 -0.62 -0.52 14.8 
Other -0.16 -0.06 59.3 0.02 -0.18 1056.7 0.32 0.14 57.6 0.36 0.27 23.5 
Range  2.52 1.67  1.63 1.41  1.82 1.56  0.77 0.78  
Note: NR indicates the effect was not reduced. This table shows the estimated effect of an extra year of residence from a model controlling for socio-demographic controls, 
country of residence and region of origin characteristics, and the % of that effect that is explained by including information on equivalising qualifications, naturalisation, 
language skills and whether the respondent attended training.  
  





Table A 1: Mean and standard deviation of variables for men 
Men Employment job Employment no job Study Refugee Family Other 
active 97.03 96.53 96.23 92.33 95.53 97.11 
 (16.99) (18.30) (19.07) (26.63) (20.67) (16.75) 
difference 
active 
7.90 6.53 2.06 -0.30 4.79 6.37 
 (24.27) (24.27) (22.33) (30.05) (26.09) (21.65) 
employed 93.45 89.95 91.43 83.60 88.74 89.62 
 (24.75) (30.07) (28.02) (37.04) (31.62) (30.52) 
difference 
employed 
-1.68 -5.21 -5.08 -12.65 -6.33 -4.92 
 (25.28) (30.67) (29.01) (37.56) (33.16) (30.34) 
ISEI 42.63 32.47 51.98 35.19 37.81 43.07 
 (18.02) (11.11) (19.07) (13.00) (14.70) (16.67) 
difference 
ISEI 
-3.02 -8.36 -2.96 -9.12 -6.64 -3.58 
 (14.09) (11.84) (17.54) (13.31) (13.92) (15.23) 
bad job 16.29 23.50 20.66 19.45 19.36 17.03 
 (36.94) (42.41) (40.52) (39.60) (39.52) (37.61) 
difference bad 
job 
6.47 11.42 10.29 10.72 8.79 6.61 
 (37.58) (42.29) (41.92) (40.36) (39.68) (37.93) 
age 42.90 40.06 38.41 42.59 41.08 43.06 
 (10.09) (9.19) (9.73) (8.96) (9.24) (9.36) 
married 71.20 68.47 55.84 70.94 72.92 63.69 
 (45.29) (46.47) (49.70) (45.42) (44.45) (48.11) 
no 
qualifications 
1.52 2.46 0.31 1.26 1.34 1.22 
 (12.23) (15.48) (5.58) (11.14) (11.52) (11.00) 
primary 
qualifications 
11.20 19.36 1.51 7.91 11.66 7.51 
 (31.55) (39.52) (12.21) (27.00) (32.11) (26.36) 
low secondary 
qualifications 
18.07 25.00 4.70 24.35 20.53 13.88 




37.86 40.15 26.92 38.51 41.61 42.57 
 (48.52) (49.03) (44.39) (48.68) (49.30) (49.47) 
post-secondary 
qualifications 
1.89 1.16 1.19 3.19 2.44 2.35 
 (13.61) (10.70) (10.84) (17.57) (15.45) (15.16) 
low tertiary 
qualifications 
26.93 11.57 58.88 24.51 22.03 30.14 
 (44.37) (31.99) (49.24) (43.04) (41.45) (45.91) 
upper tertiary 
qualifications 
2.53 0.31 6.49 0.28 0.37 2.33 
 (15.71) (5.57) (24.66) (5.28) (6.10) (15.10) 
EU member 43.89 25.51 17.12 9.49 30.76 43.87 
 (49.64) (43.60) (37.70) (29.32) (46.16) (49.65) 
Christians (%) 63.33 56.21 42.84 41.11 58.31 65.31 
 (30.94) (35.73) (33.73) (31.12) (32.30) (27.99) 







56.16 51.05 50.19 49.50 54.72 57.65 
 (12.88) (13.55) (16.91) (14.85) (14.76) (12.47) 
share 
graduates (%) 
22.25 17.68 16.70 19.66 22.54 22.07 




0.10 0.11 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.13 




-1.33 -1.88 -2.06 -2.14 -1.56 -1.19 
 (1.13) (0.88) (1.12) (0.84) (1.13) (1.18) 
years of 
residence 
1,447.40 1,276.25 1,477.06 1,419.14 1,484.63 1,462.29 
 (948.97) (804.40) (981.96) (679.63) (923.74) (884.51) 
attend course 7.91 3.72 18.15 6.57 6.18 8.17 
 (26.99) (18.92) (38.57) (24.79) (24.08) (27.40) 
equivalence 27.87 17.94 86.23 37.79 36.95 41.47 
 (44.85) (38.37) (34.49) (48.51) (48.28) (49.29) 
language skills 83.17 78.02 91.25 74.15 79.58 80.68 
 (37.42) (41.42) (28.28) (43.80) (40.32) (39.50) 
naturalise 7.75 9.34 24.97 37.98 24.05 17.79 
 (26.75) (29.10) (43.31) (48.56) (42.75) (38.26) 
count 1,767.00 3,604.00 639.00 1,067.00 2,268.00 1,046.00 
 
  




Table A 2: Mean and standard deviation of variables for women 
Women Employment job Employment no job Study Refugee Family Other 
active 95.08 93.43 91.69 87.62 87.73 91.06 
 (21.63) (24.79) (27.63) (32.96) (32.81) (28.55) 
difference 
active 
17.12 18.18 6.21 12.15 11.47 13.28 
 (27.30) (32.34) (28.95) (36.43) (38.05) (31.90) 
employed 92.40 91.09 94.08 86.41 86.80 87.67 
 (26.52) (28.49) (23.62) (34.30) (33.85) (32.89) 
difference 
employed 
-1.87 0.54 -2.05 -8.70 -6.03 -6.09 
 (27.68) (30.47) (24.06) (33.60) (34.94) (31.79) 
ISEI 38.17 28.11 51.20 31.88 34.31 40.99 
 (19.61) (14.78) (18.20) (16.12) (16.93) (17.82) 
difference 
ISEI 
-7.79 -13.65 -2.21 -11.18 -7.98 -4.93 
 (17.13) (15.57) (16.36) (16.41) (15.42) (16.15) 
bad job 13.79 25.22 18.78 27.88 23.03 21.25 
 (34.50) (43.44) (39.09) (44.88) (42.11) (40.93) 
difference bad 
job 
0.50 10.71 6.59 15.79 8.70 7.95 
 (36.31) (42.85) (39.90) (43.96) (42.43) (41.42) 
age 42.17 40.11 36.64 44.11 41.03 41.54 
 (9.62) (9.14) (9.23) (8.80) (9.40) (9.36) 
married 54.44 53.87 54.56 65.31 73.87 57.05 
 (49.83) (49.86) (49.84) (47.64) (43.94) (49.53) 
no 
qualifications 
1.67 2.13 0.00 1.88 1.93 1.30 
 (12.83) (14.44) (0.00) (13.58) (13.78) (11.32) 
primary 
qualifications 
8.95 14.09 1.27 9.10 12.18 6.95 
 (28.56) (34.80) (11.19) (28.78) (32.70) (25.44) 
low secondary 
qualifications 
15.84 24.51 4.09 17.07 23.43 15.80 




33.66 41.49 26.82 41.49 36.57 38.42 
 (47.28) (49.28) (44.34) (49.31) (48.17) (48.67) 
post-secondary 
qualifications 
2.81 1.27 2.07 4.62 2.67 3.75 
 (16.53) (11.21) (14.24) (21.00) (16.13) (19.02) 
low tertiary 
qualifications 
35.95 16.23 60.75 25.70 22.98 33.63 
 (48.01) (36.89) (48.87) (43.74) (42.08) (47.27) 
upper tertiary 
qualifications 
1.12 0.27 5.00 0.15 0.23 0.15 
 (10.53) (5.23) (21.82) (3.84) (4.80) (3.82) 
EU member 46.36 30.41 44.86 13.58 34.53 43.47 
 (49.89) (46.01) (49.78) (34.29) (47.55) (49.60) 
Christians (%) 69.22 72.03 62.99 50.94 61.28 69.00 




57.59 56.17 58.24 52.80 55.45 59.11 




 (9.90) (8.64) (11.60) (13.42) (12.87) (10.06) 
share 
graduates (%) 
21.64 19.52 21.77 22.53 21.02 22.65 




0.10 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.14 




-1.33 -1.70 -1.40 -1.98 -1.58 -1.24 
 (1.08) (0.81) (1.15) (0.84) (1.06) (1.09) 
years of 
residence 
1,404.73 1,144.28 1,389.27 1,506.99 1,492.91 1,405.99 
 (965.09) (748.79) (882.77) (747.77) (925.04) (866.70) 
attend course 8.64 5.57 17.18 8.54 8.71 10.33 
 (28.11) (22.94) (37.75) (27.97) (28.20) (30.45) 
equivalence 39.23 22.65 77.57 41.46 34.93 46.89 
 (48.85) (41.87) (41.75) (49.30) (47.68) (49.93) 
language skills 83.18 80.29 88.91 67.17 77.37 80.00 
 (37.43) (39.79) (31.43) (47.00) (41.85) (40.02) 
naturalise 10.01 10.66 18.55 42.66 25.28 20.36 
 (30.03) (30.87) (38.90) (49.50) (43.47) (40.29) 
count 923.00 2,004.00 556.00 627.00 4,720.00 977.00 
 
  




Table A 3: Estimated migrant gap at low and high host-country human capital 





Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Men Employment 
job 
11.9 8.3 -2.0 -1.9 -2.3 -3.1 5.8 7.1 
Employment 
no job 
11.7 6.9 -5.0 -5.5 -11.1 -7.7 11.5 9.9 
Average 
Economic 
11.8 7.4 -4.0 -4.3 -8.2 -6.2 9.6 9.0 
Study 11.6 1.3 -4.3 -4.6 6.5 -3.2 9.4 11.4 
Refugee 6.0 0.7 -16.6 -12.7 -11.0 -9.7 12.1 13.8 




9.8 3.0 -9.1 -7.2 -5.8 -6.8 9.0 10.8 
Other 11.7 7.0 -5.4 -3.9 -1.9 -4.1 5.9 6.8 
Range:  5.9 7.6 14.6 10.7 17.6 6.6 6.3 7.0 
Women Employment 
job 
26.2 16.9 -1.3 -2.3 -7.0 -7.8 0.0 1.1 
Employment 
no job 
25.2 17.6 -0.3 0.9 -15.7 -11.7 9.1 9.7 
Average 
Economic 
25.0 17.1 -0.6 -0.1 -12.7 -10.2 6.1 6.8 
Study 21.9 7.0 -0.2 -2.3 7.3 -3.3 5.9 8.3 
Refugee 11.9 12.7 -12.1 -8.8 -12.6 -11.8 13.5 16.0 




10.4 3.7 -8.0 -6.3 -6.1 -6.5 8.2 10.0 
Other 20.7 12.8 -6.3 -6.1 -4.3 -6.1 5.8 7.5 
 Range: 14.3 10.7 11.9 9.8 23.1 8.5 13.4 14.9 




Estimated penalty for migrant before and after matching on age, gender, education, being 
married and region; controlling for country fixed effects. The average economic is a 
weighted average (by gender) of economic migrants arriving with and without a contract; 
and the average non-economic is the weighted average (by gender) of student, refugee and 













(ISEI) Bad job Active Employed 
Status 
(ISEI) Bad job 
employment job -3.059 0.920 -1.736 3.991 -11.90*** -0.355 -5.592** 3.455 
employment no job -1.467 -8.965 -3.636 -5.403 -18.96*** -8.279 -3.730 15.37 
study -12.73*** -19.13*** -6.697* 11.18 -36.51*** -24.67*** -3.401 24.14*** 
refugee -3.638 -8.741** -5.251* 6.435* -23.32*** -15.57*** -2.030 6.158 
family -2.586 -2.251 -3.536* -0.512 -17.06*** -8.919 1.538 -1.560 
years of residence -0.257 0.353 0.186 -0.569* -1.212*** -0.236 0.348 -0.188 
reason * years 
employment job 0.178 -0.588* -0.135 -0.238 1.722*** 0.331 0.0967 -0.382 
employment no job 0.246 0.478 0.0387 1.472** 0.898* 0.534 0.739 -1.402 
study 0.589 0.0702 0.126 -0.811 1.972* 1.737* -0.352 -0.887 
refugee 0.0698 0.254 0.305 -0.420 1.520*** 0.637** 0.0232 -0.413 
family -0.0193 -0.192 -0.0932 0.639 1.191** 0.0119 -0.162 0.536 
years * years 0.00771 -0.00611 -0.00579* 0.0103 0.0221*** 0.00658 -0.00597 -0.00255 
reason*years*years 
employment job -0.00481 0.0151 0.00367 0.00126 
-
0.0371*** -0.00923 -0.00315 0.00716 
employment no job -0.0106 -0.00514 0.00334 -0.0283* -0.0208 -0.00989 -0.0193 0.0333* 
study -0.0152 0.000347 0.00436 0.0177 -0.0307 -0.0336 0.0116 0.0168 
refugee -0.00597 -0.00366 -0.00391 0.00972 
-
0.0284*** -0.0116 -0.00177 0.0103 
family -0.00286 0.00858 0.00581 -0.0101 -0.0264* -0.00240 0.00106 -0.00484 
attend course -4.211** -1.872 3.331** 5.032 0.0178 -3.093* 3.717** -0.725 
reason * course 
employment job 5.027** -3.720 3.702 -9.398* 2.794 6.506* 0.770 4.419 
employment no job 3.068 0.656 0.465 -6.636 3.923 4.726 0.356 6.381 
study 1.540 -8.350** -1.746 -7.929 -1.657 3.184 -0.399 -5.034 




refugee 2.884 0.820 -1.044 -8.069* -1.280 0.675 -1.534 -2.026 
family 4.069 -0.375 0.978 -3.576 -0.557 3.189 0.120 -6.127 
Language skills 1.257 1.380 3.892*** -2.414 3.131 1.619 3.548*** -4.168 
reason * language 
employment job 0.955 0.620 -2.282 0.295 -1.245 -2.068 0.825 0.399 
employment no job -1.708 0.0269 1.843 -5.979 8.135 0.270 0.113 -4.574 
study 2.663 14.52*** -2.011 -1.686 7.571 -0.750 0.702 -3.009 
refugee 2.333 2.166 -1.121 -2.052 6.231 4.769* 0.593 2.840 
family 2.056 0.0862 0.230 -5.526 3.899 3.137 -1.189 -4.212 
equivalised -0.150 -1.263 5.192*** -1.921 -1.230 -4.109** 4.744*** -3.432 
reason * 
equivalised 
employment job 0.0285 0.888 -3.075** 3.513 -0.739 2.424 -0.974 8.467** 
employment no job -1.059 1.991 -2.885* 4.166 5.453 0.490 -1.884 5.674 
study -2.439 -0.660 -1.908 4.486 0.511 1.570 1.259 -0.503 
refugee 1.659 0.335 -3.872*** 3.121 1.030 4.397** -1.583 1.610 
family 1.650 0.0944 -2.088* 0.665 3.820* 4.024* -0.409 4.402 
naturalised 0.135 -3.032 -0.927 7.325** -2.904 -0.733 -0.495 -4.694 
reason * 
naturalised 
employment job -0.471 2.367 2.794** -6.879* -1.150 1.399 3.874** 6.738 
employment no job 1.995 1.244 3.249 
-
12.26*** 4.745 2.544 5.413** 0.412 
study 5.494*** 5.602** 2.478* -7.322* 10.38* 5.266 3.657* -1.367 
refugee 1.562 4.863* 1.920 -8.203** 0.890 0.549 1.565 2.974 
family -0.332 2.935 3.041* 
-
9.930*** -1.231 5.831 3.903** 7.095 
age -4.511*** -0.308 -0.293 0.787* -3.989*** -0.114 -0.0850 0.602 
age*age 0.0588*** 0.000776 0.00243 
-
0.00836* 0.0549*** -0.000396 -0.000804 -0.00559 








None 31.59*** 3.864 7.897*** -5.579 41.62*** 14.39 4.136 5.541 
Primary 8.253*** 2.915 4.737*** -1.220 21.21*** 5.415*** 5.715*** -6.560*** 
Lower secondary 1.362** 0.404 3.303*** -2.965** 8.599*** -0.437 2.316* -5.478*** 
Post secondary -0.779 -0.378 -4.694*** 1.718 -2.434 -0.0635 -2.339*** -1.360 
Lower tertiary  -2.282*** 1.024 -3.897*** -1.212 -8.553*** 0.191 -2.741*** -1.806** 
Upper tertiary -6.505*** 4.903*** -1.965 -3.991 -5.845* -0.984 -2.670 -0.965 
Country (ref. = 
Austria) 
Belgium 5.077** -4.726*** -0.818 1.233 4.756 -6.426*** 3.613*** 5.124 
Germany 2.850* -2.658 -0.575 0.102 7.174** -0.515 0.132 3.248 
Spain 1.147 -4.009*** -1.607*** 12.04*** 5.600*** -3.332** -0.199 8.253*** 
France 9.513*** -5.015*** -3.870** 0.989 -0.739 -7.108*** -0.904 7.531** 
Greece 3.765*** 3.358*** -2.123*** 2.782 16.85*** -0.929 -4.587*** 4.311 
Ireland 1.888 -2.035 1.338 -3.483* 13.72*** -3.695** 5.251*** -3.000 
Italy 2.669*** 0.633 -3.756*** 1.237 -1.748 -4.141*** -2.523*** -0.482 
Luxembourg 1.649 -1.815* 2.781*** -3.021** 14.73*** -2.358* 4.573*** -2.994 
Netherlands -3.724*** -1.122 -3.406*** 5.841*** -5.541*** -3.694** -0.491 3.045 
Norway -0.613 0.630 -4.148*** 0.0660 -0.547 1.411 0.886 4.364 
Portugal 1.160 -2.336 -3.365*** 12.87*** -6.214*** -1.335 0.103 6.427* 
Sweden -0.798 -3.943*** -3.244*** 1.790 -0.744 -3.169** 0.804 4.851* 
United Kingdom 1.553 -0.134 -0.00746 2.794 1.828 0.807 3.211*** -0.442 
EU Member state 1.230 0.527 0.867 -2.590 0.512 2.613* 1.826* -3.559* 
share Christians (%) 0.0341** 0.00416 
-
0.0613*** 0.0295 0.00974 0.00388 
-
0.0773*** 0.0818*** 
female labour force 
participation (%) -0.00209 0.101*** 0.0900*** -0.0272 0.161*** 0.103** 0.149*** -0.0654 




share graduates (%) 0.0447 0.184*** 0.00451 -0.0289 -0.0385 0.142 -0.0468 -0.00807 
ratio Gini-coeff. 1.197 -1.028 5.587*** 1.999 1.673 3.187 6.155*** -4.593 
ratio GDP -0.436 -0.447 2.436*** -1.436 -0.705 -0.765 3.573*** -1.489 
Constant 84.08*** -3.416 3.485 -7.837 74.09*** -3.044 -8.592* -7.360 
Observations 10,391 9,958 9,142 9,889 9,807 8,776 7,948 8,695 
R-squared 0.213 0.039 0.144 0.038 0.216 0.032 0.182 0.034 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. LFS AHM2008, clustered standard errors, controlling for socio-demographics, country of 








Table A 5: Estimated migrant gap at low and high host-country human capital 
  Active Employed Occupational status Bad job 
Human Capital Low High Diff. Low High Diff. Low High Diff. Low High Diff. 
Men Employment 
job 
5.1 6.4 1.2 -1.7 -4.6 -2.9 -6.9 1.3 8.2 7.6 10.6 3.0 
Employment 
no job 
3.6 5.4 1.8 -6.2 -5.2 1.0 -9.8 -4.2 5.6 8.3 8.2 -0.1 
Study 5.0 5.4 0.5 -4.6 -4.3 0.3 -9.2 1.2 10.4 17.9 6.8 -11.1 
Refugee -2.2 4.8 7.0 -19.7 -3.1 16.5 -10.7 -4.0 6.7 10.6 9.0 -1.5 
Family 1.2 8.0 6.8 -7.4 -3.0 4.4 -8.4 -3.3 5.1 9.9 5.7 -4.1 
Other 1.6 6.2 4.6 -4.9 -4.7 0.2 -10.5 -1.1 9.3 14.4 2.6 -11.8 
Women Employment 
job 
12.7 11.7 -1.0 -1.5 -4.8 -3.2 -10.2 -2.4 7.8 7.6 -4.7 -12.3 
Employment 
no job 
18.3 14.1 -4.1 1.0 -0.5 -1.5 -15.0 -3.5 11.5 7.0 10.3 3.3 
Study 2.5 19.8 17.3 -4.0 -3.9 0.1 -7.2 4.2 11.4 9.5 -1.3 -10.8 
Refugee -1.1 16.3 17.5 -7.7 -4.8 2.9 -16.3 -2.9 13.4 22.3 5.1 -17.2 
Family 5.8 12.9 7.1 -10.2 -3.7 6.5 -12.3 -3.9 8.4 9.9 5.0 -4.9 
Other 7.6 13.0 5.5 -10.8 -1.0 9.8 -10.8 -0.7 10.1 13.0 8.0 -5.0 
Estimated penalty for migrant with low vs high host-country human capital (language skills, naturalised, equivalised qualifications), controlling 
for socio-demographics, country fixed effects and sending region characteristics estimated at 15 years of residence.




Table A 6: Effect of years of residence and human capital on employment in different samples 
 Employment Men Women 
 










Empl. Job 0.23 0.40 0.14 -0.10 0.07 -0.09 
Empl. no job -0.06 -0.15 -0.17 0.04 0.12 -0.31 
Study 0.61 0.97 0.74 0.23 -0.04 0.12 
Refugee 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.96 1.18 0.20 
Family 0.41 0.60 0.42 0.30 0.38 0.34 
Other 0.21 -0.21 0.48 -0.14 -0.07 -0.46 
Attend 
course 
Empl. Job -1.87 -3.56 -1.47 -3.09 -7.02 -6.29 
Empl. no job -5.59 -7.54 -9.96 3.41 3.54 0.62 
Study -1.22 -1.33 -2.08 1.63 2.65 0.19 
Refugee -10.22 -9.50 -13.16 0.09 -0.28 3.98 
Family -1.05 -2.85 -0.32 -2.42 -2.65 -3.44 
Other -2.25 -2.47 -1.57 0.10 1.69 -3.15 
Language 
skills 
Empl. Job 1.38 2.57 0.84 1.62 -0.21 0.93 
Empl. no job 2.00 2.22 2.80 -0.45 1.29 -2.47 
Study 1.41 2.38 2.45 1.89 3.29 -2.11 
Refugee 15.90 15.76 13.96 0.87 0.19 4.18 
Family 3.55 2.30 5.10 6.39 6.12 8.15 
Other 1.47 1.08 1.00 4.76 -1.74 -0.89 
Equivalise
d 
Empl. Job -1.26 -0.79 -3.77 -4.11 -4.02 -3.38 
Empl. no job -0.37 -1.52 0.56 -1.69 -1.46 2.61 
Study 0.73 0.80 4.73 -3.62 -5.75 -2.12 
Refugee -1.92 -2.76 1.09 -2.54 -3.13 -1.91 




Family -0.93 0.13 -1.70 0.29 0.35 -0.15 
Other -1.17 -1.55 -0.09 -0.09 -2.95 1.57 
Naturalis
ed 
Empl. Job -3.03 -2.64 -2.91 -0.73 -2.13 -1.25 
Empl. no job -0.67 -0.83 -1.84 0.67 1.03 -2.12 
Study -1.79 -3.93 -2.61 1.81 2.67 -2.73 
Refugee 2.57 3.33 -0.43 4.53 4.91 2.79 
Family 1.83 1.95 1.63 -0.18 -0.60 1.07 
Other -0.10 1.30 -0.79 5.10 3.27 3.17 
Marginal effects estimated from model controlling for socio-demographic and sending 
country controls and country of destination, interacting reason for migration with years of 
residence (squared) and host-country human capital, estimated at 10 years of residence, with 
three specifications: the main one used in the paper; one where only non-EU migrants are 
used, and a model using migrants having been in the country longer than 10 years. Bold 
numbers are statistically significant (at p<0.05). 
 
  




Table A 7: Effect of years of residence and human capital on occupational status 













Empl. Job 0.07 -0.06 0.21 0.23 0.63 0.29 
Empl. no job 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.26 0.41 0.28 
Study 0.18 0.27 -0.37 0.58 0.74 0.41 
Refugee 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.11 0.21 -0.18 
Family 0.30 0.35 0.43 0.22 0.25 0.03 
Other 0.09 0.08 0.34 0.09 -0.01 0.04 
Attend 
course 
Empl. Job 0.13 0.16 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.10 
Empl. no job 3.33 4.41 5.68 3.72 4.28 3.30 
Study 7.03 8.23 1.78 4.49 4.37 7.98 
Refugee 3.80 4.75 5.60 4.07 2.44 6.65 
Family 1.59 1.69 1.03 3.32 3.42 2.71 
Other 2.29 1.12 3.16 2.18 1.25 2.46 
Language 
skills 
Empl. Job 4.31 4.15 6.05 3.84 5.31 4.85 
Empl. no job 4.36 4.96 3.34 3.18 2.84 3.94 
Study 3.89 5.50 1.89 3.55 2.55 0.56 
Refugee 1.61 1.48 1.48 4.37 2.76 4.12 
Family 5.73 6.40 7.62 3.66 3.78 -3.02 
Other 1.88 1.68 1.88 4.25 3.75 3.64 
Equivalise
d 
Empl. Job 2.77 3.96 1.58 4.14 3.90 4.37 
Empl. no job 4.12 6.42 2.25 2.36 2.64 1.32 
Study 2.80 3.22 2.07 3.93 3.40 3.20 
Refugee 5.19 5.76 5.19 4.74 8.44 3.47 




Family 2.12 2.27 1.25 3.77 4.78 3.24 
Other 2.31 2.44 2.13 2.86 6.15 1.96 
Naturalis
ed 
Empl. Job 3.28 3.88 3.05 6.00 7.07 6.55 
Empl. no job 1.32 1.09 1.53 3.16 3.34 2.89 
Study 3.10 2.66 -2.61 4.33 7.08 5.22 
Refugee 2.71 2.72 -0.43 3.73 4.88 3.48 
Family -0.93 0.87 1.63 -0.49 -0.77 -1.58 
Other 1.87 2.07 -0.79 3.38 2.99 3.28 
Marginal effects estimated from model controlling for socio-demographic and sending 
country controls and country of destination, interacting reason for migration with years of 
residence (squared) and host-country human capital, estimated at 10 years of residence, with 
three specifications: the main one used in the paper; one where only non-EU migrants are 
used, and a model using migrants having been in the country longer than 10 years. Bold 
numbers are statistically significant (at p<0.05). 
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estimated effect of extra year of residence at 5 years of residence
without host-country human capital (bar) and with (scatter) with 95% C.I.
controlling for socio-demographics, country, origin characteristics
effect of extra year of residence, at 5 years
active employed status bad job




































































estimated effect of extra year of residence at 15 years of residence
without host-country human capital (bar) and with (scatter) with 95% C.I.
controlling for socio-demographics, country, origin characteristics
effect of extra year of residence, at 15 years
active employed status bad job
